Greg Detre
11/5/01
non-naturalist might like supervenience
but Mackie + Blackburn use supervenience as an argument against
common parlance: morality supervenience
same circumstances, same morals
anti-realist � it�s just a matter of feeling
feelings are clued into natural facts of the world � Humean argument appeals to best explanation
is morality an independent realm of facts, or just feeling?
need for observing minds
Blackburn � moral judgements, not talk of facts
level of moral discourse not ontology
metaphysical argument from queerness
inconceivable what moral facts would be
objective + prescriptive � action-guiding by definition
epistemological argument from queerness
consensus
intuition � subject to error, + disagreement, perception
not empirically verifiable
naturalist: senses
colour = power to produce the senation in the receiver under standard circumstances
≠ colour, cf Jackson�s Mary
good���� ≠ causing pleasure
������ = having the power to cause warm glow in normal evaluator
gives standard of correctness
discrepancies arise under exceptional circumstances or non-normal perceiver
normal ≠ average
�������������� = virtuous (Aristotelian)
how define virtuousity in non-circular terms???
specification of virtuous person
Aristotle � someone who is functioning well + rationally
quasi-biological (teleological)
needs to be in terms of PQs
what about supervening relation???
but all morality is mind-dependent for its consequences???
neutral until minds occur???
reason 2Q